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Jurors in the Material World: Putting
Tort Verdicts in Their Social Context
Deborah R. Hensler*
"Today, a megayacht is indispensable. It's not like 15
years ago, when a yacht was a luxury item."
1
"If people spend their money to buy my books [in the
amount of $15 million annually], some of it comes to me.
In very explicit terms, it's democracy in action.
'
,
"I think there are people, including myself at certain
times in my career, who because of their uniqueness
warrant whatever the market will bear.
'3
* Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School.
I am grateful for comments and encouragement received from attendees at
the 2007 AALS Tort Section meeting, from participants at this symposium,
and from workshop participants at Chicago-Kent Law School and Stanford
Law School, especially Professors Nancy Marder, Janet Alexander, and
Daniel Ho. I gratefully acknowledge research assistance from Rishi Satia.
1. Olivier Milliex, head of yacht finance at ING Bank, as quoted by John
Tagliabue, For the Yachting Class, the Latest Amenity Can Take Flight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at C1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage
.html?res=9CODEIDB1739F931A35753C1A9619C8B63. See also Valerie
Cotsalas, Resorts Respond to the Yacht Parking Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2007, at C6, available at http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/09/05/realestate/com
mercial/05yacht.html.
2. Author Tom Clancy, as quoted in James W. Michaels, Should Anyone
Earn $25,000 a Day?, FORBES, May 25, 1992, at 10. Clancy was responding to
the question whether he was "entitled" to earn $15 million in a single year.
"What are you, a communist?" he asked, before explaining that his earnings
illustrated "democracy in action." Id.
3. Leo Hindery, Jr., founder of the YES Network and currently a
manager of a private equity fund, as quoted by Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of
the Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, § 1, at 1.
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"No reasonable jury could have found that the [plaintiff
was entitled to $50 million in compensatory damages."
4
I. INTRODUCTION
Political rhetoric and empirical analyses regarding civil jury
decision-making focus on the jury verdicts themselves,
independent of or in relation to the characteristics of the cases in
which such verdicts are rendered. What goes on in the world that
surrounds juries-that is, in the culture that jurors are a part of-
receives scant attention. There are only a few examples of jury
verdict analyses that relate verdicts to the characteristics of jurors
(e.g., gender, race and ethnicity),5 which may contain information
about jurors' place in the larger world and hence the social
influences that operate on them. Most analyses of the jury
decision-making process rely on laboratory experiments that
attempt to replicate the de-contextualized world of the jury room.
The lack of attention to the social context of jury decision-making
is not surprising; after all, jurors themselves are instructed to
base their decisions solely on the evidence presented in the
courtroom.
But jurors-however instructed by judges-are real people
whose lives are shaped by their social environment. In this
article, I place jury verdicts in the social context in which they
were delivered. Specifically, I compare the magnitude and growth
rate of jury verdicts issued from 1992 through 2001 in the nation's
largest state trial courts with the material rewards accorded
others--particularly executives at large corporations-as reported
by the mass media. I argue that we ought to expect juries'
valuations of plaintiffs' losses to be colored by valuations of other
people's worth in the marketplace, as exposed by the mass media.
Growth in average jury verdicts that is not explained by economic
inflation (e.g., growth in the Consumer Product Index, or CPI) or
by changes in the composition of the civil jury trial caseload may
4. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. La.
2006).
5. For a review of empirical literature on the effects of jurors' race on
jury decision-making, see Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How
Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science
Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003).
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be attributed to a phenomenon I term "social inflation," that is,
the increase over time in the amount of material wealth society
perceives as adequate for certain individuals.
Jurors are not supposed to take cultural trends into account
in deciding tort damages: their charge (ignoring issues of
comparative negligence) is to make the plaintiff whole, meaning
that if the plaintiff is an ordinary blue-collar worker or full-time
homemaker, jurors are to assess economic damages (and some
would argue non-economic damages as well) in relation to the
plaintiffs comparatively low status in the economic hierarchy.
Outsized awards raise questions, therefore, about whether jurors
have properly carried out their legal function. But the political
reaction to outsized awards, particularly as expressed by members
of the socio-economic elite, may be driven as much by dismay that
juries are upsetting the socio-economic hierarchy, as by concerns
about the economic rationality of the tort system.
My article has two objectives, one empirical and the other
normative: by placing jury verdicts in the context of other
contemporary data on material rewards, I hope to provoke
research on my social inflation hypothesis, and seek to undermine
a cultural consensus that outsized jury verdicts in tort damage
suits are inherently unreasonable, that outsized executive
compensation and other elite material rewards are inherently
rational, and that jury verdicts and the material rewards society
showers on its most fortunate members have nothing to do with
each other.
II. THE DEBATE OVER JURY VERDICTS IN TORT LIABILITY
CASES
Tort reform is conventionally framed by its supporters as a
means of lowering costs, directly for corporations and their
insurers, and indirectly for consumers and citizens.6 Indeed, tort
6. For a discussion of the framing of tort reform as an economic issue,
see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform,
53 EMORY L.J. 1225, 1237-62 (2004). For an example of business press
coverage focusing on the effect of tort litigation on the economy, see Michael
Freedman, The Tort Mess, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 90 ("It's even worse than
you think. Out-of-control lawsuits are shutting down medical practices,
killing businesses and costing the economy $200 billion a year."). For an
example of academic analysis focusing on the economic impact of tort
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reformers have coined the term "tort tax" to convey the notion that
tort litigation imposes undesirable costs on the economy.'
Large jury awards, particularly for non-economic and punitive
damages, are the favored exemplars of the excessive costs of tort
litigation. s Although the number and rate of civil jury trials have
decreased dramatically,9 just enough trials remain to produce
verdicts, see Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, Op-Ed., Vioxx Verdict's
Dark Side, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 2005, at A15, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/ 2 0 0 5/08/2 3 /
vioxx verdicts dark side/. Shavell and Polinsky argue that the $253 million
jury verdict in a Texas trial alleging that Vioxx caused the plaintiffs
husband's death has negative import for consumer prices and pharmaceutical
industry investment in research and development, and that the deterrence
value of the verdict is unnecessary given regulation by the Food and Drug
Administration. Id. They further suggest that there is no reason for the
plaintiff in this Vioxx suit to receive more than the "several million dollars"
typically awarded to the "surviving spouse of an automobile accident victim."
Id.
In this case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $450 thousand in economic
damages, $24 million in non-economic damages (mental anguish and loss of
companionship), and $229 million in punitive damages. Associated Press,
Jury Finds Merck Liable in Landmark Vioxx Case: Widow of Texas Man Who
Died After Taking Drug Awarded $253 Million, Aug. 19, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9006921/. As a result of tort reform in Texas,
punitive damages are limited to an amount equal to twice the amount
awarded for economic damages, plus the amount awarded for non-economic
damages up to a cap of $750,000. TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
41.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Applying this formula, the punitive damage
award would be capped at $1.65 million, leaving the plaintiff with a total
award of $26.1 million. See id.
7. See, e.g., Jim Copland, Op-Ed, The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11,
2003, at A16, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.orglhtmlVwsj-
the_torttax.htm; Sean Parnell, "Tort Tax" Costs Illinois Jobs, Economic
Growth, BUDGET & TAX NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.heartland.org/Article
.cfm?artId=18398. A recent study by the Tillinghast business of Towers
Perrin estimates the total cost of tort liability in 2005 at $261 billion, or $880
per capita. NAMIC Online, Study: U.S. Tort Costs Total $261 Billion in 2005:
Growth Rate for Tort Costs Is the Smallest Since 1997 (Dec. 14, 2006),
http://www.namic.org/topnews/061214stl.asp. According to Tillinghast, per
capita tort costs declined slightly in 2005 from their 2004 level. Id.
8. For a discussion of the portrayal of jury verdicts by tort reform
supporters, see STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM (1995).
9. According to the Court Statistics Project, from 1996 to 2005, annual
tort filings in the thirty states for which detailed long-term trend data are
available dropped 21%. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 2006, at 13 (Robert C. LaFountain et al. eds., 2007),
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2 0 0 6_files/EWSC-
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occasional humongous awards for the media to fasten upon10 and
for tort reform supporters to highlight in sustaining their
argument that the legal system has gone awry.'
Large jury verdicts also provide the basis for a more high-
minded critique of tort litigation: namely, that it relies on
decision-making by cognitively impaired lay jurors. That Nobel
laureate Daniel Kahneman and noted University of Chicago law
professor Cass Sunstein have implicitly endorsed the "irrational
jury" paradigm with their research on cognitive biases in jury
decision-making has not been lost on tort reform advocates. 12 The
asserted irrationality of jury decision-making supports additional
arguments against tort litigation: that the costs it imposes on
corporate defendants are largely unjustified, 13 and that tort
2007WholeDocument.pdf. Total civil case filings in general jurisdiction
courts (based on forty-three states) rose about 5% during that period,
meaning that the fraction of state court civil litigation attributable to tort
cases decreased. Id. at 12. From 1995 to 2002, the total number of civil jury
trials in state courts of twenty-two states decreased 25% (from 23,453 to
17,617). National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project,
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/cspfTrialTrends/CSPtrialtrends.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (data available in a Microsoft Excel file which can
be downloaded from hyperlink "Civil Dispositions and Trials, 1976-2002").
By 1995, the percent of all civil case dispositions attributable to jury trials
had already fallen below one percent. Id. (same).
10. For example, in August 2005, the media trumpeted a Texas jury's
verdict of $253.5 million ($24.450 million in economic and non-economic
losses, plus $229 million in punitive damages) in a suit against Merck,
attributing the death of the plaintiffs husband to his use of Vioxx. Alex
Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com2005/08/20/
business/20vioxx.html?ref=business [hereinafter Berenson, Jury Calls Merck
Liable]. Because punitive damages are capped under Texas law, § 41.008(b),
the verdict would automatically be cut to $26.1 million. See supra note 6. In
fact, by fall 2007, Merck had yet to pay any of the award, which it appealed.
Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 21, 2007, at Al.
11. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES: 2007 (2007),
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE
L.J. 2071, 2074-81 (1998) (proposing that policy reforms should be instituted
to control erratic and unpredictable jury awards that result from the jury's
power to valuate damages on an unbounded scale of dollars, such as with
punitive damages).
13. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The Tort Tax: Greedy Trial Lawyers Are
Slowing Economic Growth and Investment, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2003,
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liability is unpredictable.
Taken together, these arguments comprise a powerful attack
on the theory and practice of tort litigation, and one that has
proven remarkably effective over the past several decades. To
date, thirty-six states have adopted limitations on non-economic
damages in some or all tort suits, 15 and twenty-two states have
adopted caps on punitive damages. The United States Supreme
Court has weighed in with its own tort reform measure, limiting
punitive damages to a modest multiplier of compensatory
damages, 17 and instructing courts that juries may not consider the
harms defendants have imposed on people not before the court in
determining the proper amount of punitive damages, even in cases
where the defendants' behavior has caused mass harms.
1 8
But the views of tort reform that focus on its narrow pursuit
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof bartlett/bartlett030303.asp;
John Engler & Dan Pero, End Jackpot Justice, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005,
at A17, available at http://www.nam.org/s-nam/docl.asp?CID=201613&DI
D=233023.
14. For a discussion of the political debate over the role of juries in tort
litigation, see Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306-31 (Robert E. Litan ed.,
1993).
15. NAMIC Online, Noneconomic Damage Reform, http://www.namic.org/
reports/tortReform/NoneconomicDamage.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
Thirty-four of the thirty-six states imposed caps on the absolute amount of
non-economic damages. Id. In twenty-three of these thirty-four states the
caps apply only to medical malpractice suits. Id. According to NAMIC, the
highest courts of three states have declared limitations on non-economic
damages unconstitutional. Id.
16. ATRA, TORT REFORM RECORD 19-31 (2007), http://www.atra.org/
files.cgi/8140_Record_12-07.pdf. ATRA lists thirty-four states that have
restricted punitive damages in some fashion since 1986, including raising the
standard for awarding damages (e.g., requiring plaintiffs to show by "clear
and convincing" evidence that a defendant's conduct was "wanton"). Id.
17. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003) ("[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages ... will satisfy due process."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996) ("When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1,
however, the award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow'"
(quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
18. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007); see
also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 ("Due process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties'
hypothetical claims against a defendant....").
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of corporate self-interest (as perceived by tort reform critics) or its
concern about reducing unjustifiable burdens on economic
productivity (as perceived by tort reform supporters) miss its
arguably more important political thrust, which may explain the
movement's continuing focus on jury verdicts in an era of the
vanishing trial. For at least some conservative critics of the tort
system, the problem with relying on jury decision-making to
decide tort cases is not jurors' cognitive failings, but rather their
predilection for wealth redistribution. 9  Under this view, juries
are seeking to change America's (increasingly unequal)
distribution of wealth and other resources, a distribution that
favors tort critics, who are largely members of America's socio-
economic elite and their political representatives." That the
plaintiffs trial bar, a beneficiary of perceived jury largess, has
been a significant source of financial support to the Democratic
Party -which is portrayed, however unrealistically, as an
19. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, Can Tort Reform and
Federalism Co-Exist?, POLICY ANALYSIS, Apr. 14, 2004, at 1,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa514.pdf ("Critics of federal tort reform have
usually come from the political left and its allies among the trial lawyers,
who favor a state-based system that can be exploited to redistribute income
from deep-pocketed corporations to 'deserving' individuals."); Tort Reform:
Sense of Rationality Brought to a Tort System Gone Amok, REG.-HERALD, July
3, 2003, at 4A, available at http://www.wvcala.comothers saying/news7.html
("Unfortunately, the [tort] system has transformed from a venue for dispute
resolution to a tool for social justice and income redistribution."); Ed
Rubenstein, Punitive Damages, NAT'L REV., Nov. 4, 1991, at 16, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n20_v43/ai_11523363
("The legal profession has become increasingly engaged in redistributing
property and income rather than protecting it. Punitive-damage awards are
fingered by the White House Council on Competitiveness as a prime
suspect.").
20. Perhaps not irrelevantly, in the process wealth is transferred to the
least-elite sector of the bar. For some suggestive data supporting anecdotal
observations of the non-elite character of the plaintiff trial bar, see Posting of
Ed Morrison, Where Did High-End Plaintiffs' Lawyers Go to Law School?,
http://www.elsblog.org/the-empirical-legal-studi/2006/12/wheredid-highe.ht
ml (Dec. 4, 2006, 10:17 AM) (showing 32% of Inner Circle Trial Lawyers(hundred leading plaintiff trial lawyers, chosen by that bar) graduated from
top twenty-five law schools, as compared to 64% of lawyers at the top two
hundred law firms listed by the American Lawyer magazine).
21. Kate O'Beirne, Cash Bar: How Trial Lawyers Bankroll the
Democratic Party, NAT'L REV., Aug. 20, 2001, at 26, available at
http://findarticles.comp/articles/mi_m1282/is_16_53/ai_76915714; Jim
Copland, Kerry-Edwards & Co.: Trial Lawyers, Inc. Run for President, NAT'L
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advocate of wealth redistribution 22-resonates with this view of
the redistributive thrust of jury decision-making in tort cases.
III. A PROFILE OF JURY VERDICTS IN TORT LIABILITY SUITS,
1992 - 2001
Are jury verdicts in tort cases redistributive? One way juries
might display such redistributive tendencies would be to routinely
find in favor of individual plaintiffs who sue corporate defendants
or affluent individuals, without regard to the facts of the case.
Many of the tort anecdotes that highlighted the 1980s tort reform
wave highlighted alleged instances of such jury awards. But
aggregate jury data indicate that these instances (even when
correctly portrayed) were aberrant: in cases most likely to fit the
paradigm of an individual plaintiff versus a corporation or affluent
individual, such as product liability and medical malpractice suits,
state and federal juries have consistently been more likely to favor
defendants than plaintiffs; by contrast, in automobile accident
cases, where plaintiff and defendant are more likely to be
individuals of equal status, juries tend to favor plaintiffs (see
Figures 1 and 2).
REV. ONLINE, July 8, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/copland
200407080820.asp; Scott Horton, Justice in Mississippi, HARPER'S MAG., Sept.
18, 2007, http://www.harpers.orgarchive/2007/09/hbc- 9 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 .
22. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Income Redistribution, GOP-Style: The
House Takes Money from the Poor and Spends It on the Rich, SLATE, Aug. 6,
2002, http://www.slate.com/?id=2069049 ("Democrats want to redistribute
income downward, to the poor"); O'Reilly Opposes Income Redistribution -
Unless He's on the Receiving End!, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM., May 21, 2004,
http://mediamatters.org/items/20040521000 5 .
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 1-5 (2004); Stephanie Mencimer,
False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry and the GOP
Promote the Myth of America's "Lawsuit Crisis," WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2004,
at 18, 19-20, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004
/0410.mencimer.html.
24. Evidence from jury experiments is also inconsistent with the
hypothesis that juries' decisions are affected by defendant wealth. See Robert
J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the "Deep Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 121, 121
(1996).
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Figure 1
Percent Jury Verdicts for Plaintiffs in State Court Cases
(Seventy-five Largest Counties)
80
60- 
- OProduct liability
40 i EMedical malpractice
20 - [']Automoobile
0 -
1992 1996 2001
Source: National Center for State Courts
25
Figure 2
Percent Jury Verdicts for Plaintiffs in Federal Court Cases
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25. The National Center for State Courts has conducted three surveys of
civil jury verdicts in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States for
1992, 1996, and 2001. The results of these surveys have been presented in a
series of Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reports. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET
AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf (1992 data); MARIKA F.X.
LITRAS ET AL., TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (2000),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlc96.pdf; THOMAS H. COHEN, TORT
TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (2004). The raw survey data
are available from the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social
Research (ICPSR), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
The author tabulated the data in Figure 1 from the ICPSR datasets. See id.
26. The Federal Integrated Database includes records for all civil cases
filed in federal courts over the last several decades, available from the Inter-
University Consortium on Political and Social Research (ICPSR),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). The author
tabulated the data in Figure 2 using the Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form
designed by Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont. See Judicial
Statistical Inquiry Form, http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2008).
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To be sure, juries might repress redistributive desires when
deciding liability, only to express them when awarding damages.
Most analyses of jury awards in tort cases have found that
compensatory awards are consistently related to the severity of
27the plaintiffs injury, but injury severity and other
characteristics of tort cases that analysts have been able to
measure do not fully explain variation in verdicts. Some analysts
28
attribute such unexplained variance to jury unreliability or bias,
which might include redistributive tendencies, but Neil Vidmar
and his co-authors have argued that objective differences among
cases that analysts failed to measure could explain such
differences.
If redistributive biases exist, it seems likely that they would
be evinced more frequently in the calculation of non-economic
damages, for which juries arguably receive instructions that are
less clear, in comparison to economic damages, which should
reflect past and future medical costs, work loss, and other
"special" damages. Determining what proportion of jury awards
are damages for non-economic losses from reported jury verdict
data is not always possible. Using data on a variety of tort claims
tried to juries in different jurisdictions over the last three decades,
including product liability and medical malpractice cases, analysts
have estimated variously that non-economic damages account for
as little as 40% 30 to as much as 70% 31 of total dollars awarded by
juries to compensate losses. In an early study, Randall Bovbjerg
and his co-authors found more variation generally in the non-
economic portions of jury damage assessments than in the
• 32
economic portions. Analyzing more recent jury verdict data in
medical malpractice cases from New York, California, and Florida,
Vidmar and his co-authors found that the non-economic portion of
jury awards was correlated with injury severity, with such
27. See Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and
Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1998).
28. See, e.g., W. KIP VisCusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 95-99
(1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 923-24 (1989).
29. Vidmar et al., supra note 27, at 269.
30. Id. at 285.
31. Viscusi, supra note 28, at 102-09.
32. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 28, at 932-36.
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damages accounting for a lower proportion of total compensation
for more serious injuries, in comparison with less serious injuries
and wrongful death cases.33 They also found greater variability in
the proportion of damages accorded for non-economic losses (as
measured by the standard deviation) in cases of less serious injury
and wrongful death.34
As Vidmar and his co-authors note, variability in non-
economic damages within categories of injury severit (or death)
does not by itself signal jury capriciousness or bias. Indeed, in
her recent analysis of jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases in
California, Florida, and Maryland, Professor Finley found a
systematic relationship between the proportion of damages
accounted for by non-economic losses and gender and age.36
Focusing on a sample of 131 medical malpractice cases from 1992
through 2002 in which California juries awarded more than
$250,000 in non-economic damages, Finley found that for female
plaintiffs, average non-economic damages accounted for 78% of
average total compensatory damages, while for male plaintiffs the
average was 48%. As for age, non-economic damages accounted
for 66% of total compensatory awards to plaintiffs (male and
female) over sixty-five, on average, and 98%, on average, in cases
of wrongful death where the victims were infants or children.
38
Similar gender and age differences were observed in the Florida
and Maryland data. On average, juries award less in economic
damages to women, the elderly, and children-as Finley
33. Vidmar et al., supra note 27, at 286 tbl.2, 295 tbl.8.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 296.
36. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004).
37. Id. at 1284-85.
38. Id. at 1287, 1292. An independent analysis of the California data for
roughly the same time period reports the same patterns. See NICHOLAS M.
PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 32 (2004).
39. For the Florida results of Finley's analysis, which show that the
average compensatory damages awarded to female plaintiffs comprised
proportionally more of non-economic damages by comparison to damages
awarded to males, see Finley, supra note 36, at 1297-1306. Analyzing eighty-
eight personal injury cases decided in Maryland between 1988 and 1999,
Finley discovered that on average females received 44% more than men in
non-economic damages, which makes women more likely to be affected by
damages caps. Id. at 1307.
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demonstrates by reference to individual case data-because these
plaintiffs are not in the labor force, or - in the case of women -
work at lower-paying jobs or provide services to their families,
such as housekeeping and child care, that are not accorded a high
monetary value.40  But jurors award more in non-economic
damages, on average, to women, either in an effort to reach a total
award that the jurors believe is appropriate for the injury suffered
or because, as Finley argues, jurors value the components of non-
economic loss - lost reproductive ability, lost sexual function, lost
intimacy - as worthy of high compensation. 41 Ironically, because
it imposes hard caps on non-economic damages, it is tort reform
legislation itself that has a "redistributive" effect, reducing
women's compensation for injury proportionally more than it
reduces compensation to similarly injured males. A RAND study
of California medical malpractice data estimated that women lost
an average of 39% of their total compensatory awards as a result
of California's MICRA cap, compared to a reduction of 31% for
males.42
In sum, direct evidence of redistributive bias in jury verdicts
in tort cases is lacking. Yet, aggregate jury verdict data indicate
that jury awards in tort cases have continued to grow over time,
even after normal inflation has been taken into account. Figure 3
shows median and mean awards for compensatory damages only
(i.e., excluding punitive damages) in product liability cases in the
state courts of the seventy-five largest counties of the United
States in 1992, 1996, and 2001. In some trials, juries decide
awards for several plaintiffs at a time. Because I am interested in
how juries assess the value of individuals' lives and losses, the
data presented in Figure 3 have been adjusted for the number of
plaintiff winners. 43 Figures 4 and 5 show these same per plaintiff
medians and means, adjusted first for overall inflation (i.e., using
40. Id. at 1280-81.
41. Id. at 1266, 1281-82.
42. PACE ETAL., supra note 38, at 33.
43. Large jury verdicts are often reduced by settlement, remittitur, and
reversal on appeal. See Michael G. Shanley, The Distribution of Posttrial
Adjustments to Jury Awards, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 464 (1991). Because
this article focuses on jury behavior (and because information on final
outcomes after jury trial is not reported systematically), this article reports
original jury verdicts rather than final outcomes.
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the CPI) and second for medical inflation, arguably the more
appropriate inflation adjustment for tort suits, in which medical
costs, on average, account for a large fraction of economic losses.
During this time period, medical inflation outstripped overall
inflation. After adjusting for inflation (general and medical),
median product liability awards grew little in these seventy-five
counties, but between 1996 and 2001, mean compensation awards
increased by about three times.
Figure 3
Per Plaintiff Median and Mean Compensatory
Awards in State Court Product Liability Cases
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'Mmean
1992 1996 2001
(Nominal $)
Source: National Center for State Courts
44
44. The author tabulated mean and median verdicts using raw National
Center for State Courts civil trial survey data, archived by the Inter-
University Consortium on Political and Social Research (ICPSR), https:
/www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). The dataset included
asbestos and non-asbestos product liability cases decided by juries only. See
id. Means and medians for 1996 and 2001 were calculated for the
distribution of per plaintiff awards, arrived at by dividing the total
compensatory damages awarded in each trial by the number of plaintiff
winners in that trial. The 1992 dataset did not permit such an adjustment.
The results therefore somewhat underestimate changes over time from 1992.
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Figure 4
CPI Inflation Adjusted Per Plaintiff Median and Mean Compensatory
Awards in State Court Product Liability Cases
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Figure 5
Medical Inflation Adjusted Per Plaintiff Median and Mean
Compensatory Awards in State Court Product Liability Cases
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Source: National Center for State Courts (adjusted by author)46
45. Original data from sources cited supra note 44, adjusted for inflation
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation adjuster, CPI Inflation
Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
46. Original data from sources cited supra note 44, adjusted for inflation
using the medical inflation adjuster from Tom's Inflation Calculator,
http://www.halfhill.com/inflation.html.
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Mean awards, of course, reflect the presence of outliers.
Usually, in jury verdict data, mean awards outstrip medians
because of the presence of a small number of very large awards.
As shown in Figure 6, after accounting for inflation, the frequency
of high-value compensatory awards (per plaintiff) in product
liability cases in the largest metropolitan state courts increased
dramatically from 1992 to 2001.
Figure 6
Percent of High-Value (Per Plaintiff) Compensatory Awards
in State Court Product Liability Cases
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Source: National Center for State Courts
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Growth in mean plaintiff verdicts, coupled with large nominal
awards, fuels the perception that juries are engaging in
redistributive behavior (or are simply "out of control"). But
longitudinal analyses of jury verdict data suggest that changes in
median and mean verdicts over time may reflect differences in the
composition of the jury trial caseload rather than changes in jury
behavior. As the risks and expenses of trials have increased over
time, and perhaps in response to changes in other factors as well,
plaintiff attorneys' willingness to take lower value cases to trial
has diminished, resulting in juries hearing higher value cases-
47. The author calculated data using the National Center for State
Courts raw civil jury survey data archived by the Inter-University
Consortium on Political and Social Research (ICPSR), https://www.icpsr.umi
ch.edul (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). The dataset included asbestos and non-
asbestos product liability cases decided by juries only. See id.
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those with more substantial medical costs, work loss, etc.-than
they heard in the past.48 However, after taking certain case
characteristics (e.g., defendant type) and claimed losses into
account, an unexplained increase in average real dollar awards
remains in the types of cases that typically involve individual
plaintiffs facing off against corporations or higher status
individuals.9
III. THE MATERIAL CONTEXT FOR JURY DAMAGE AWARDS
Suppose that juries are systematically awarding more money
today than in the past, even when inflation is properly accounted
for, in cases that pit individual plaintiffs against more powerful
individuals and corporations. As a thought experiment, let us
imagine what might drive such behavior. One possibility is that
jurors' notions of what certain losses (including loss of life) are
worth might be influenced by values that are placed on other
people's lives or contributions to society, such as corporate
executives' compensation packages, athletes' endorsement
packages, or entertainers' salaries. Perhaps, in other words, in
48. See Seth A. Seabury, Nicholas M. Pace & Robert T. Reville, Forty
Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 18-19, 23 (2004)
(finding that jury awards in San Francisco and Cook County, Illinois grew an
average in real dollars of 2.4% annually over a forty year period but that
virtually all of the growth is explained by changes in the mix of case types
(e.g., plaintiff and defendant characteristics, type of tort) and claimed medical
and non-medical losses).
49. Taking claimed medical and non-medical losses, jurisdiction, and
plaintiff and defendant characteristics into account, real dollar awards in
automobile accident cases in San Francisco and Cook County actually
declined an average of 1.3% annually over the forty year period. Id. at 21-22.
Taking claimed medical and non-medical losses, plaintiff and defendant
characteristics, and type of non-auto tort into account, real dollar awards in
non-auto tort cases, including medical malpractice and product liability,
increased about 1.6% annually. Id.
50. Juries could award more in total damages by awarding more for non-
economic loss, relative to economic loss, awarding larger punitive damages, or
even awarding more for economic loss in situations where punitive damages
are not available. See Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun,
Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages,
23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327-28 (1999).
51. Similarly, perceptions of appropriate punitive damage amounts
might be shaped by reports of corporate profits generally, as well as
information on a specific corporate defendant's financial position introduced
at trial. Analyzing the correlation between punitive damage awards and
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addition to general inflation in costs or inflation in medical costs
specifically, there is what we might term a "social inflation" factor
affecting high-end jury verdicts.
In recent years, the media have devoted considerable52
attention to executive pay. Salaries and other remuneration for
athletes, entertainers, and "celebrities" generally also receive
substantial and continuing coverage. If civil juries' notions of
the appropriate amounts to compensate plaintiffs injured or killed
are shaped by their environment, we might expect such reports to
help define that environment.54
corporate profits is complicated by the very small number of punitive damage
awards in product liability cases. I have not undertaken such an analysis for
this article.
52. See, e.g., Ellen Simon, Hundreds of CEOS Top $8.3 Million Pay
Mark, USA TODAY, June 9, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/
management/2007-06-09-ceopayN.htm?loc=interstitialskip&loc=interstitial
skip (discussing the enormous compensation America's top CEOs receive,
which eclipses subordinate executives, pro athletes, and movie stars); Ellen
Simon, Jets, Golf, Yachts, Beer: CEOS Rake in Extras, USA TODAY, June, 9,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2007-06-09-
ceoperksN.htm (even as CEO pay increases, companies provide their top
executives with perks that include flights on corporate jets and payments for
executives' taxes). Since January 1, 2000 the New York Times has published
more than 3,500 articles on "executive compensation." NYTimes.com,
http:/www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (running an advanced
search of "executive compensation"). Articles include features on the salary
and perks of individual CEOs, as well as discussions of executive
compensation trends. Id. I identified 2,655 such articles by searching
"executive compensation" from January 1, 1990 - December 31, 1999, the
time around which the jury verdicts I have described were delivered. Id.
53. Since January 1, 2000, the New York Times has published more than
1,800 articles on baseball player salaries, 111 of which discussed "highest-
paid" players, and more than 1,600 articles on football player salaries.
NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (running
advanced searches of "baseball salary," "baseball salary highest-paid," and
"football salary"). Hollywood.com, which boasts "over 10 million monthly
visitors," provides copious information on salaries of movie and TV actors and
actresses. Hollywood.com, Salaries, http://search.hollywood.com/movies/Sal
aries (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). Salary.com provides an on-line calculator
for comparing your salary, by the minute, to that of your favorite celebrity.
Salary.com, Salary Timer, http://swz.salary.com/salarytimer/layoutscripts/
stmlstart.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). You can also calculate the
difference between your salary and a favorite salary, converted into Big
Macs, Air Jordans, Barbie Dolls, and Lexus SUVs. Id.
54. I am not suggesting that jurors consciously decide to award a
particular plaintiff a specific amount of money because they have heard or
read reports of such an amount being paid to a particular star athlete or a
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A. A Comparison of Jury Damage Awards and Executive
Compensation
How to calculate executive compensation in an era of stock
options, signing bonuses ("golden hellos" 55), severance packages
("golden parachutes 56), and other perks, has been a subject of
considerable scholarly attention and some dispute over the past
decade.5 ' For this thought experiment, I rely on Forbes
Magazine's annual executive compensation report, which is often
cited in national news media as a source of rankings of the
"richest" or "best paid" people in the United States.
high-profile CEO. Instead, I argue that jurors' beliefs about the appropriate
amounts to award for non-economic damages may be affected, in part, by a
social environment in which large salaries and other material rewards
afforded executives, athletes, and "celebrities" are frequently reported and
celebrated.
55. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Gilded Greetings, FORBES, May 15, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2007/05/14/golden-handshakes-ceo-oped-
czemd_0515golden.html.
56. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Much Too Golden Years, FORBES, June 6,
2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/05/retire-ceos-compensation-lead-comp-
cx em_0604pensions.html;Gretchen Morgenson, The C.E.O.'s Parachute Cost
What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, § 3, at 1, available at http://select.nytimes
.comi/2007/O2/04business/yourmoney/O4gret.html?n=Top/ReferenceTimes%2
OTopics/Subjects/E/Executive%2OPay. In January 2007, Home Depot gave its
former chief executive, Robert Nardelli, a $210 million severance package,
despite the company's poor performance while under his watch. Eric Dash,
An Ousted Chiefs Going-Away Pay Is Seen by Many as Typically Excessive,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/
04business/04pay.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%2OTopics/Subjects/E/Execut
ive%20Pay. Eight months later, Chrysler Corporation gave Nardelli another
chance when it appointed him as its CEO. Micheline Maynard, Once
Tainted, Now Handed Chrysler Keys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/business/07auto.html; cf
Gretchen Morgenson, A Lump of Coal Might Suffice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2006, § 3, at 1, available at-http://select.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/business/yo
urmoney/24gret.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%2OTopics/Subjects/EExecutiv
e%20Pay (reporting Henry McKinnell's $200 million severance package,
Pfizer's failed CEO).
57. See, e.g., The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate
Governance, Working Papers, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-cen
ter/corporate-governance/papers.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
58. See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Billionaire Beachcombers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2007, § 9, at 1 (noting that Forbes Magazine ranks Larry Ellison, the
chief executive of Oracle, the eleventh richest man in the world); Don Van
Natta Jr., Big Coffers and a Rising Voice Lift a New Conservative Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at Al (noting that Forbes Magazine ranks Sheldon
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Figure 7 shows median and mean total compensation for the
twenty-five best paid CEOs among the 800 companies Forbes
surveys, from 1992-2001. 59 In nominal dollars, both median and
mean compensation increased fourfold over the period.
Figure 7
Median and Mean Total Compensation,
Twenty-five Highest Paid CEOs
Source: Forbes Magazine
60
120000-
80000.
60000-
40000-
20000.
1992 1996
(Nominal $)
2001
After adjusting for inflation,
compensation of these highest paid
over the period (see Figure 8).
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Adelson, the chairman and chief executive of the Las Vegas Sands
Corporation, sixth among the world's billionaires).
59. Early in the period, Forbes reported salary, bonuses, and "other"
direct compensation as components of total compensation, including the value
of stock options, Eric Hardy, Beating the Taxman, FORBES, May 24, 1993, at
118, but by 2002 their published data ranked CEOs by total compensation
only. Forbes Best Paid CEOs, FORBES, May 2002 [hereinafter CEOs]. The
difference is sizeable: for example, in 1992, the median and mean salaries of
the Twenty-five highest paid executives were $1.744 million and $2.870
million, respectively, as compared to $15.832 and $25.213 million in total
compensation. See Hardy, supra.
60. Data are drawn from various articles citing compensation data for
the previous year appearing in Forbes. See Hardy, supra note 59 (1992 data);
Eric S. Hardy, The Prize, FORBES, May 19, 1997, at 166 (1996 data); CEOs,
supra note 59 (2001 data).
Omedian
[]mean
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Figure 8
Median and Mean Total Compensation of
Twenty-five Highest Paid CEOs,
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Source: Forbes Magazine (adjusted for inflation by author)
61
Figure 9 compares median and mean total compensation
packages for the twenty-five highest paid corporate CEOs to
median and mean per plaintiff compensatory awards in product
liability cases, for the three years for which we have jury data for
a large sample of state courts. Because in my thought experiment
civil jury valuations of plaintiff losses are influenced by the
material rewards given to executives, celebrities, athletes, and
others that are contemporaneously reported by the mass media, I
use nominal rather than adjusted amounts for this comparison. I
compare medians and means for the total distribution of product
liability verdicts to medians and means for high-earning CEOs
only because my purpose is to explore whether material rewards
that attract media attention might influence jury behavior on
average. In Figure 9, average jury verdict amounts are difficult to
discern, because they are so dwarfed by average executive
compensation amounts.
61. See sources cited supra notes 59-60.
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Figure 962
Per Plaintiff Median and Mean Compensatory Jury Verdicts in
Product Liability Cases,
Compared to Median and Mean Total Compensation for
Highest Paid CEOs
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How did rates of growth in average executive compensation
and average damage awards in product liability cases compare?
As shown in Figure 10, after adjusting for inflation, mean (but not
median) per plaintiff compensatory damages awarded by juries in
product liability cases rose dramatically from 1992-2001, on a
trajectory that was almost identical to the growth rate of median
and mean high-earning CEOs' compensation. In sum, in cases in
which they found defendants liable, civil juries deciding how much
to award plaintiffs were doing so in an environment of rising
material awards for others, which might have influenced their
decisions.
62. Data on CEO compensation from sources cited supra note 61. Data
on product liability awards from sources cited supra note 44.
I
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Figure 10
Rate of Change in Per Plaintiff Median and Mean Compensatory
Awards in State Court Product Liability Cases,
Compared to Median and Mean Total Compensation for
Highest Paid CEOs
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B. A Comparison of Jury Awards to Other Material Awards
Compiling trend data on compensation of others-athletes,
entertainers, and celebrities generally-proved more difficult. For
consistency, I relied on Forbes's annual lists, and focused on the
top ten earners on each list.s3 Figure 11 compares the average
single year remuneration in 2001 for Forbes-identified top-earning
celebrities (a category including athletes, entertainers and
others); 6 dead celebrities (a category including Elvis Presley and
63. Forbes uses different cut-offs for different lists: one list ranks the top
100 earners, another the top twenty-five, and a third the top thirteen. I chose
to focus on the top ten both for consistency's sake and to provide a balanced
comparison with the top jury awards, for which I was only able to identify the
top ten verdicts.
64. See Forbes.com, The Celebrity 100, July 20, 2002, http://www.forbes.
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Tupac Shakur, the rap artist); top-earning CEOs;66 and the mean
of the top ten compensatory awards issued in 2001 in product
liability suits nationally, as reported by the National Law
Journal.6 1 In 2001, the average compensation for top-earning
corporate executives was several times the average amount
earned by top-earning celebrities, and both averages were
substantially greater than the mean high-end product liability
award.
com/statichtml/celebs/2002.html (follow "money rank" hyperlink).
65. See Betsy Schiffman, Earnings from the Crypt: Top-Earning Dead
Celebrities, FORBES, Aug. 12, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2002/08/12/08
12deadintro.html.
66. See CEOs, supra note 59.
67. See Law.com, Top 100 Verdicts at a Glance,
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/2002/nljverdicts.html (displaying
chart obtained by the National Law Journal's February 2002 issue). The
National Law Journal's list includes a variety of case types including class
actions and financial injury suits. See id. I selected those verdicts the
journal labeled as issued in product liability cases. The top 100 verdicts
included twelve product liability verdicts. See id. Although the journal does
not report components of awards, a review of case documents and media
reports found that in one case, Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), the whopping verdict of $3.006 billion
included $3 billion in punitive damages, with the remaining compensatory
award an unexceptional $6 million. Diana Digges, Teamwork Brings Record
$3 Billion Verdict Against Big Tobacco, LAW. USA, Jan. 7, 2002,
http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/usa/lverdict2001.cfm. I excluded this case
from further analysis as the compensatory award was well below that of the
one hundredth case included in the list, which was valued at $19.4 million.
In a second case, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Rankin, the $100 million
verdict was an award in a mass action involving multiple plaintiffs. See
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31, 35-36, 51 (Miss. 2004).
Since the focus of my discussion is jury valuation of individual plaintiff
worth, I excluded this verdict from my list of top awards as well. In two of
the remaining cases, a large portion of the award was also attributable to
punitive damages. See, e.g., Michael M. Bowden, $480 Million to Three
Injured in Plane Crash, LAW. USA, Jan. 7, 2002, http://www.lawyersweekly
usa.com/usa/3verdict200l.cfm (reporting Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co.).
Figure 11 shows the average compensatory award in the top ten product
liability cases, excluding punitive damages. According to the National Law
Journal, at the time of its report, all of the top awards in product liability had
either been settled, remitted, had motions pending at the trial court level, or
were on appeal. See Law.com, supra. Figure 11 shows the average of the
original jury awards, rather than the actual amounts-often reduced-paid
after the verdict was issued.
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Figure 11
Material Rewards for High-Earners in Various High-Profile
Categories, Compared to High-End Compensatory Jury Verdicts in
Product Liability Cases, 2001
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IV. REFRAMING THE DEBATE OVER JURY AWARDS IN TORT
LIABILITY SUITS
Empirical analyses of jury awards in tort liability suits focus
on the relationship between damages and claimed losses. This
focus is consistent with the jury's task: to assess damages in
particular cases based on the evidence of loss presented in the
courtroom. But as a response to the public debate over civil jury
decision-making, this analytic focus misses an important
dimension of the political controversy: elite distress over the
potential for jurors--generally representative of the middle and
working class demographics of the population--to up-end the ever
more unequal socio-economic hierarchy of the United 
States.68
68. See Greg Ip, Income-Inequaltiy Gap Widens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
2007, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119 2 1 582 24 13 5 5 7
069.html. Nancy Marder has suggested that inclusion of a broader stratum
of society on juries today, by contrast with the past, may partially explain the
attack on civil jury decision-making. Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the
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Contrast Forbes's coverage of tort litigation with its coverage
of executive compensation. In a 2002 article entitled The Tort
Mess, Forbes reporter Michael Freedman described a wrongful69
death lawsuit arising out of emergency medical care. As
described by Freedman, the jury heard "equally qualified"
opposing experts testify in turn that the care afforded the victim
was negligent and not. The care provided had a "tragic ending,"
But doctors and insurance companies are easy targets in
the hands of tort lawyers. The jury awarded the widow
$5 million, double what a similar case might have yielded
just a few years ago.
The country has grown immune to verdicts like these: $5
million for a medical tragedy; $50 million in punitive
damages for business interference ... ; $150 million to six
Mississippi plaintiffs . . . who . . . fear they may suffer
someday from asbestos-related illnesses; $1 billion for
punitive damages over the alleged contamination of 33
acres of land....
In the next few years, . . . tort costs could increase twice
as fast as the economy, going from $200 billion last year
[20011 to $298 billion.., by 2005.71
In a matter of a few paragraphs the $5 million award to a
widow ballooned into an almost $300 billion burden on the
economy-and all of us.
In a 1993 article on executive compensation entitled Beating
the Taxman, Forbes reporter Eric Hardy described the highlights
of the magazine's recently released executive compensation report
more sympathetically. 72 Four of the year's twenty-five best-paid
CEOs worked in the health care industry, including the CEO of
National Medical Enterprises, who had recently resigned "amid
Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 923
(2003). On wealthy Americans' belief that their place in the socio-economic
status hierarchy is deserved and ought not to be undermined (for example, by
reinstating a progressive tax structure), see Uchitelle, supra, note 3.
69. Freedman, supra note 6, at 91.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Hardy, supra note 59.
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charges his company overbilled the government."73  "Sure, the
total compensation of these four executives is a lot of
money-almost one-third of a billion dollars during the last five
years," wrote Hardy,7 4 "[b]ut keep in mind that three of them
founded their own companies. They took the initial risk, put their
own capital on the line and created more jobs for the economy.
How many jobs has Hillary Clinton created?"75
There is little evidence that civil jury verdicts in tort liability
76
suits are redistributive. Whether jurors' valuations of plaintiffs'
losses are influenced by what they read or hear about material
rewards accorded powerful executives, entertainers, athletes, and
other celebrities has not, to my knowledge, been investigated.
Would it be inappropriate for jurors to compare the worth of the
plaintiffs before them to the worth of corporate executives,
athletes, entertainers, and other celebrities? Comparing salaries
across disparate categories did not seem unreasonable to Forbes
reporters writing in 1992:
"[i]s executive pay really out of line with what we pay
people at the top of other fields-our most successful
heart surgeons, authors, anchormen, cartoonists and
professional models?" they asked.77
Are money managers "worth" 20 times what top
executives are worth? Are singers and dancers worth
more than people in whose hands rests the responsibility
for much of the nation's prosperity... ?
Athletes . . . fetch a lot of money these days, in part
because TV allows their talent to be enjoyed by a lot of
people....
Given that the health of much of our economy depends on
their decisions, top business executives are at least as
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. In fact, Americans are famously acceptant of economic inequality.
See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR?: AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1981).
77. Dana Wechsler Linden & Dyan Machan, Put Them at Risk!, FORBES,
May 25, 1992, at 158.
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important to our society as surgeons and perhaps more so
than athletes and musicians.78
Executives themselves, Forbes reported, thought it unfair for
the media to focus on their salaries, rather than, for example,
Michael Jordan's.9
Salaries, one might argue, reflect the earner's merit and
indirectly their contribution to the economy. Hence, for juries to
allow their assessment of damages to be shaped by executive and
other figures' remuneration would be socially, as well as legally,
inappropriate. But vast empirically-based literature now argues
that corporate executives' compensation poorly-if at all-reflects
executives' contribution to shareholders' wealth . Indeed, as
shown in Figure 12, there is virtually no correlation between
rankings of top CEOs by their total annual compensation and
78. Id.
79. See Vicki Contavespi, What About Michael Jordan's Pay?, FORBES,
May 23, 1994, at 142 ("Nine out of ten [CEOs] feel the media freely criticize
executive salaries while ignoring the often much higher earnings of
entertainers and athletes like Michael Jordan . . . ."). For a comparison
among executives, entertainers, and athletes, see Eduardo Porter, More Than
Ever, It Pays To Be the Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/25/business/25execs.html?ex=l
349236800&en=efa73831d9a85611&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=pe
rmalink.
80. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2005)
(reviewing research on CEO pay and evidence of a lack of relationship
between pay and corporate performance); Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers
& Urs Peyer, Pay Distribution in the Top Executive Team 6, 24-28 (Harvard
Law and Econ., Discussion Paper No. 574, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=954609 (finding CEO's
fraction of the total compensation awarded to the top five executives at a firm
is negatively correlated with corporation performance); Lucian Bebchuk,
Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs 1-3 (Harvard Law and Econ.,
Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=945392 (finding that 12% of firms made one or more
stock option grants to CEOs on the day that the corporation's stock was
priced at its minimum, and that such "lucky grants" were in addition to,
rather than a substitute for, other forms of compensation); see also Barnaby
J. Federer, While Citigroup Struggled, Its Chief Was Paid $26 Million in
2006, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/03/14/business/businessspecial/14citipay.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%
20Topics/Subjects/E/Executive%2OPay (noting that while Citigroup's CEO
Charles Prince's pay increased, the company's "share price . . . remained
essentially flat").
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measure of performance as calculated by Forbes. Moreover, the
stock options that led to enormous increases in executive
compensation over the past decade may have encouraged CEOs to
take risks that produced net losses to shareholders, rather than
net gains.l
Figure 12
Total Compensation for Top Ten CEO Earners,
Along with Measures of "Efficiency"
8 2
Top Ten CEO Compensation, 2006
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In a pattern similar to the relationship observed between
CEO compensation and performance, Forbes also recently
reported, as shown in Figure 13, that Hollywood's top earning83
stars are not those who earn the most for movie producers.
81. Floyd Norris, Rethinking Risk's Role in Bosses' Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
12, 2007, at C1.
82. Forbes.com, CEO Compensation, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/12/
TotComp-1.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). "Efficiency" is a measure of
CEO's performance/pay score. Id. Forbes's efficiency ratings range from 1 to
189, with 1 being most efficient. Id. Such ratings are calculated only for
CEOs with at least a six year tenure and compensation history; thus, missing
data in Figure 12 indicate a CEO who has served for less than six years. Id.
83. Dorothy Pomerantz, Ultimate Star Payback, FORBES, Aug. 6, 2007,
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Figure 13
Top Earning Hollywood Stars, 2006-20078
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How facts and issues are framed by politicians, interest group
representatives, and the media has powerful effects on the
political attitudes and behavior of their listeners and viewers. 5
That the movement of the stock market-rather than the average
wage of employees in the service industry or the number of people
looking for work-is reported daily indicates that we ought to view
stock prices as a measure of how healthy the economy is, although
only half of Americans actually have funds invested in the
86
market. A disproportionate amount of equity value is held by the
affluent elite, and-in any event--there is substantial evidence
that short-term stock price movement reflects "herd behavior"
http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/03/celebrities-hollywood-movies-biz-
cz-dp_0806starpayback.html.
84. Actor earnings taken from Forbes.com, The Celebrity 100, June 14,
2007, http://www.forbes.comflists/2007/53/07celebritiesThe-Celebrity-100-R
ank.html (listing celebrities', including actors and actresses, entertainment
earnings from June 2006 to June 2007). Film revenues earned per dollar
paid to actor ratio taken from Pomerantz, supra note 83. Note that the ratio
uses numbers from the pertinent actor's or actress's last three films. Id.
85. See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611
(2000).
86. See Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik & Jeremy C. Stein, Social
Interaction and Stock-Market Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137, 137 (2004),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/-hhong/jfsocial.pdf (about 49% of
American households owned stock in 1998).
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rather than economic productivity.8 7  Reporting jury awards
without regard to the social context-such as the losses suffered
by plaintiffs or the behavior that defendants engaged in that
invited a verdict against them-invites us to marvel at the
unreasonableness of the magnitude of such awards. Imagine a
news report announcing the Vioxx jury's $50 million award-
which Louisiana federal district court Judge Eldon Fallon found88
unreasonable -and comparing it to the $ 40.6 million total
compensation package reported for Merck's CEO Ray Gilmartin in
2004 (the year Vioxx was withdrawn from the market), or to the
87. Robert R. Prechter, Jr. & Wayne D. Parker, The Financial /Economic
Dichotomy in Social Behavioral Dynamics: The Socionomic Perspective, 8 J.
BEHAV. FIN. 84, 96-100 (2007).
88. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740-41 (E.D. La.
2006). The plaintiff in the case was a former FBI agent who took Vioxx for
chronic back and neck pain from 1999 - 2004. Id. at 738. He suffered a heart
attack in 2002, at the age of 58, which he alleged was due to Vioxx. Id. The
jury found Merck liable on two theories of liability, and awarded $50 million
in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. Id. at 738-39.
On defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a
new trial, Judge Fallon found the liability verdict to be reasonable, id. at 739-
40, but ordered a retrial on damages:
The [c]ourt finds that the $50 million compensatory damages award
is excessive under any conceivable substantive standard of
excessiveness. The evidence suggests that the [plaintiff may have
lost nine or ten years of life expectancy as a result of his use of
Vioxx. He also has past medical bills for which he may be
compensated, and perhaps future medical bills as well.
Furthermore, the [p]laintiff is entitled to compensation for his pain
and suffering and other intangible losses. However, the [p]laintiff is
retired, and therefore he cannot recover for lost wages or lost
earning capacity. While the [plaintiff may be experiencing a
decrease in energy, it appears that he has been able to return to
many of his daily activities. Therefore, no reasonable jury could
have found that the [p]laintiffs losses totaled $50 million.
Id. at 740-41.
89. USATODAY.com, Special Report: Executive Pay 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2004-ceo-pay-total-
chart.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008) (reporting executive compensation data
provided by Aon Consulting's eComp Data Services); cf Holly Sklar, CEO Pay
Is Still on Steroids, PROVIDENCE J., May 10, 2005, http://www.projo.com/opi
nion/contributors/content/projo_20050510_ctsklar.200d6ba.html (reporting
Gilmartin's 2004 total compensation at $37.8 million). Merck appointed
Richard Clark to succeed Gilmartin as CEO in 2005. See Merck, Corporate
Governance,
http://www.merck.com/cr/company-profile/corporate-governance/home.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2008). Clark reportedly made $6.2 million in 2006,
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giant severance package, worth more than $180 million, awarded
to Henry McKinnell, the CEO of Pfizer, when McKinnell was
pressured to step down because of Pfizer's disappointing
performance during his tenure. 90 Putting high-end jury awards
and high-end executive compensation packages "on the same
page" offers a different perspective on jury decision-making in tort
liability suits. Rather than deriding the occasional jury that
places a high value on a plaintiffs loss, perhaps we ought to adopt
Tom Clancy's perspective and view it as "democracy in action."91
including salary, bonuses, and stock options, in part in response to his
success in managing the Vioxx litigation. Pharmalot, Merck's CEO Made
$6.2M Last Year, http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/02/mercks-ceo-made_62m
-last-year/ (Feb. 9, 2007, 5:15 PM).
90. Associated Press, Pfizer's McKinnell To Get $180M Package, INT'L
Bus. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20061221/pfizer-
inc-039-s-former-chief-executive-henry-a-mckinnell.htm.
91. See supra note 2.
